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Why Do You Speak That Way?-Symbolic
Expression Reconsidered
by HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN*
Introduction
Few areas of first amendment law are as confused, or as perplexing,
as the case law involving the protection of "symbolic speech."' This con-
fusion results from the Supreme Court's overly narrow analytical focus.
While accepting the necessity of balancing competing interests of the
government's need to regulate certain forms of expression against the
speaker's first amendment freedoms,2 the Court's discussions tend to
concentrate primarily on the government's side of the balance-regula-
tion 3 -rather than on the nature and extent of the speaker's interest.4
The communications of all symbolic speakers cannot be grouped to-
gether as an undifferentiated mass of civil libertarian sentiments; the
motivations of individual speakers vary widely.5 The current focus of the
Supreme Court fails to distinguish among speakers' motivations for em-
ploying symbolic speech, whereas recognition of these differences should
constitute an important part of the Court's balancing test. The Court
must first examine why an individual has chosen expressive conduct as
his preferred form of communication; only then can it gauge the extent of
his claim to first amendment protection.
* B.A., Ohio State University; J.D., Harvard University; LL.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity. Professor of Law, University of Toledo. The author wishes to thank Professors Donald
Lively, William Richman, and Henry Bourguignon for their helpful insights, and David
Chontos for his research assistance.
1. See generally M. NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.06 (1984); J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsrtUONAL LAW §§ 16.48, 16.49 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter .
NOWAK].
2. For a discussion of the competing "absolutist" approach, see Black, The Bill ofRights,
35 N.Y.U. L. Rtv. 865 (1960).
3. See infra notes 6-23 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of balancing in first amendment cases, see M. NIMMER, supra note 1,
§§ 2.02-2.06; Carrafiello, Weighing the First Amendment on the Scales of the Balancing Test:
The Choice of Safety Before Liberty, 8 S.U.L. REV. 255 (1982); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1482 (1975); Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of
Justice Powell, 24 STAN.. L. Rnv. 1001 (1972).
5. See infra, notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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This Article discusses the present state of symbolic expression under
the First Amendment and the possible effect of judicial consideration of
the speaker's motivation. Part I analyzes the present tests used by the
Court and suggests that an inquiry into speaker motivation would actu-
ally further the policies underlying the present tests. Part II examines
five possible motivations for expressive conduct and concludes that the
courts should give these motivations great weight in determining whether
the First Amendment protects certain types of symbolic speech.
I. Traditional Approaches To Symbolic Speech
A. The O'Brien Test: Fear of the Slippery Slope
In United States v. O'Brien6 the Supreme Court developed criteria
for reviewing government regulation of symbolic expression. In uphold-
ing O'Brien's conviction for publicly burning his draft card, the Court
developed the following four-part test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inciden-
tal restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.7
In O'Brien, this proved to be an undemanding test. The Court de-
clared relatively chimerical governmental interests to be substantial and
subjected to little real examination the government's motivation vel non
to suppress speech.' The Court clearly stated its apprehension: "We
cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct
can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct in-
tends thereby to express an idea."9
Since O'Brien, commentators have advanced similar arguments,
suggesting that once the Court starts down the path of fully protecting
expressive conduct, no end exists to the kinds of laws that can be broken
in order to make a point."° This fear of an unending slippery slope is,
however, unfounded. Most antisocial conduct has little connection to
protected first amendment activities." Few violations of law appear mo-
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. Id at 377. See Ely, supra note 4, at 1483-84; Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic
Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. Rnv. 1.
8. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12-6 (2d ed. 1988).
9. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
10. See Ely, supra note 4, at 1487-88.
11. For a discussion of the types of crime prevalent in the United States, see U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE-THE DATA (October, 1983).
SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION RECONSIDERED
tivated by an attempt to communicate ideas effectively.12 Although it
may sometimes be difficult to determine whether the offender intended to
communicate ideas,13 often the common-sense differences in communica-
tive content clearly appear in various types of superficially similar con-
duct. As the late Professor Robert Cover stated:
[M]any of our actions [can] be understood only in relation to a
norm.... There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday
and refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and desecrat-
ing the fast of Yom Kippur, between banking a check and refusing
to pay your income tax. In each case an act signifies something
new and powerful when we understand that the act is in reference
to a norm.
14
The same can be said of symbolic expression. There is a difference
between burning one's income tax records in order to destroy evidence of
tax evasion and doing so in order to protest an oppressive tax system. In
the rare cases that truly involve the latter scenario, courts cannot ignore
first amendment considerations.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 15 the Court recog-
nized the possibility that any type of conduct, if supported by the appro-
priate intent, might be protected expression. In Clark, demonstrators
sought to focus attention upon the plight of the homeless by sleeping in
Lafayette Park. The Court put to rest the spectre of endless numbers of
scofflaws seeking protection of the First Amendment, raised earlier in
O'Brien, simply by reallocating the burden of proof. The Court held:
Although it is common to place the burden upon the Government
to justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the ob-
ligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive
conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.
To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all conduct is
presumptively expressive.
16
Under this approach if a person proves that his conduct was "intended to
be communicative and that, in context, it would reasonably be under-
stood by the viewer to be communicative," 17 it will be treated as speech.
Thus the Court took an essential first step toward adequately ad-
dressing the problems arising from symbolic speech. The decision in
12. While any theft offense might be interpreted as a communication of the offender's
contempt for private property, we generally assume that an intent to communicate such ideas
is not the offender's primary motive. Regarding the requirement for objective intent to com-
municate, see Note, Symbolic Conduct, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 1091, 1109-13 (1968).
13. See, M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 3.06[c].
14. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (1983).
15. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
16. Id at 293 n.5.
17. Id. at 294.
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Clark opened the door to an approach in this area that recognizes the
symbolic speaker's intent as a factor in determining when expression in-
volved in certain symbolic conduct merits first amendment protection.
B. The Two-Track Analysis: The Reunification of First Amendment
Theory
Clark signaled a new approach to symbolic expression cases by re-
jecting the notion of a separate body of jurisprudence for symbolic ex-
pression; instead it described the O'Brien test as "little, if any, different
from the standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions."' 8
The Court thus assimilated symbolic expression into the broader body of
first amendment jurisprudence. Applying the so-called "two-track"
analysis, 9 the Court stated that restrictions on symbolic expression are
"valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information."2
The application of this "reasonable time, place, or manner" analysis
to symbolic expression will permit courts to focus upon the generally-
ignored, but crucial, question of why an individual chooses to express
himself through symbolic conduct rather than through oral or written
communication. The form of communication a speaker chooses gener-
ally will turn upon how the speaker thinks he can most effectively convey
his meaning. Thus, just as a speaker might choose to address an immi-
grant audience in a foreign language, he might choose symbolic expres-
sion in order to assure effective communication in other situations.
Indeed, it might well be argued that the First Amendment, in prohibiting
government from "abridging" the freedom of speech, is directed primar-
ily at limitations that reduce the effectiveness of speech. Courts should
fully protect the symbolic speaker when equally effective means of com-
munication are not available.
The Court's traditional two-track first amendment analysis points to
the same conclusion. The state cannot justify even narrow and impor-
tant content-neutral restrictions if adequate alternative channels of com-
18. 468 U.S. at 298. In the words of Justice Marshall, the inquiry is "whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a partic-
ular time." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Other cases employing the
"time, place, and manner" approach include United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983);
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
19. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2.
20. 468 U.S. at 293.
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munication are unavailable to the speaker. An alternative is adequate
only if it is approximately as effective in conveying the speaker's message
as the regulated channel of communication. The Supreme Court made
this connection in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,21 when it up-
held a Los Angeles ban on the posting of signs on public property. The
Court observed:
While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to em-
ploy every conceivable method of communication at all times and
in all places.... a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid
if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate....
Notwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief con-
cerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indi-
cates that the posting of political posters on public property is a
uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that
appellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-
increasing restrictions on expression.22
Courts can realistically appraise the effectiveness of alternative
channels of communication in symbolic expression cases only after they
have acknowledged that often a speaker initially chooses to use symbolic
speech because other forms of expression would ineffectively convey his
point.23
C. The Speech-Conduct Distinction: A Troubling Irrelevance
Much of the writing on symbolic expression focuses upon the dis-
tinction between speech and conduct.2" A rather simple syllogism fol-
lows from this approach: the First Amendment protects speech, not
conduct. Symbolic expression is in part conduct. Therefore, symbolic
expression is less protected than pure speech.2" With Clark's implicit
invalidation of this syllogism's major premise,26 courts and commenta-
tors should take a different approach.
The results of many of the symbolic expression cases can be justified
without relying on the speech-conduct distinction. First, the "clear and
present danger" test prohibits incitement to imminent illegal action, even
21. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
22. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
23. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, it appears that respondents did
not argue that the restriction there imposed on symbolic expression impaired the effectiveness
of their speech. The majority stated, "Respondents do not suggest that there was, or is, any
barrier to delivering to the media, or to the public by other means, the intended message
concerning the plight of the homeless." 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
24. The distinction is spelled out most elaborately in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION passim (1970). See also Ely, supra note 4, at 1493-96.
25. T. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 17-18.
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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when the incitement arises from pure speech. 27 Furthermore, when the
speech falls outside the core area of political discussion,28 the Court has
applied less exacting standards to uphold prohibitions on encouragement
of illegal action. In such cases the Court has not insisted upon a showing
of clear and present danger as it has in order to justify the suppression of
political speech. For example, all recent commercial speech cases reaf-
firm the holding of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations29 by refusing to protect commercial speech when it
proposes or advertises an illegal activity.3"
When individuals have undertaken to advocate illegal conduct
through symbolic speech, the courts have sometimes failed to recognize
the analogy to Pittsburgh Press. When that advocacy takes the form of
something beyond the speaker on the soap box or the pamphleteer,
courts have often described the situation as one involving "speech plus"
31
or "speech brigaded with illegal action."3 2 Most of these cases involve
labor picketing. Courts view the picketers' illegal secondary boycotts,
violation of other laws, or violation of valid labor agreements as illegal
activities subject to regulation.3 The problem here, however, is not the
"plus" part of the speech. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,34 the Court
viewed the fact that speech had been "brigaded by illegal action" as irrel-
evant to the protection of the portion of activity that involved lawful
encouragement of a valid boycott. Thus, the central issue of the "speech-
plus" cases is not the symbolic form of the speech, but whether speakers
have violated or incited violation of labor relations laws or other valid
regulations. An illegal secondary boycott, for example, receives no
greater first amendment protection when it is imposed through speech
27. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Greenawalt, Speech and Crime,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645.
28. For a discussion of the types of speech that fall within this core area, see Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REv. 245, 255-57.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (refusing to protect commercial speech when it proposes and
advertises an illegal activity).
30. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. New York Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (for commercial speech to be protected, it at least must concern "lawful
activity").
31. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
32. See Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (citing
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 480, 498 (1949); NLRB v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1941)).
33. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 1, § 16.55.
34. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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without picketing than when it is effectuated by speech plus picketing.35
The existence of or incitement to illegal action is thus the determin-
ing factor in both the speech-plus cases and in the more traditional clear-
and-present-danger cases. The presence of communicative conduct
rather than oral or written communication is not the relevant issue.
Therefore, the speech-plus cases should not stand as an impediment to
developing an approach to symbolic speech that focuses upon the
speaker's concern about communicating effectively. The issue of effective
communication parallels the requirement for effective alternative chan-
nels of communication in the "time, place and manner" test applied in
more general first amendment contexts involving access to streets, side-
walks, or parks for expressive purposes.
II. A New Approach to Symbolic Expression Cases
The importance of symbolic expression lies in its ability to enhance
the speaker's effectiveness in reaching his audience or in making his
point. At least five different types of motivations exist for employing
symbolic expression rather than other types of speech: (1) expressive
conduct better encapsulates an idea;36 (2) expressive conduct is more so-
cially acceptable; 37 (3) expressive conduct attracts media attention;3" (4)
expressive conduct creates a greater feeling of self-fuilfllment; 39 and (5)
expressive conduct facilitates other forms of speech.' Whether a
speaker could convey his message as effectively through oral or written
speech depends on his motivation for choosing symbolic speech. In de-
ciding the extent to which the first amendment should protect symbolic
speech, courts should consider a symbolic speaker's motivation for choos-
ing that medium as a determining factor.
A. Capsuling An Idea
The Supreme Court has often extended the highest level of first
amendment protection to cases in which symbolic speech is closely akin
to pure speech-where it is clear that the idea itself could not be as con-
cisely or clearly communicated through mere words. In such cases, as
Justice Brennan observed in a slightly different context, expressive con-
35. See Harrah's Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 912
(1971) (a union's sending telegrams to its members urging them to support a strike by another
union's members constitutes an unfair labor practice).
36. See infra pp. 593-95.
37. See infra pp. 595-97.
38. See infira pp. 597-98.
39. See infira pp. 599-600.
40. See infra pp. 600-01.
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duct has "a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or
conjure up an image.
' 41
In Stromberg v. California,42 defendant, supervisor of a Young Com-
munist League summer camp, directed children in a ceremony raising a
red flag, in violation of a statute that prohibited such a display "as a sign,
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invita-
tion or stimulus to anarchistic action ... ."I Here it was apparently
clear to the legislature that enacted the statute that the red flag was a
concise and powerful symbol of an idea. In reversing the conviction of
the defendant, the Court upheld the use of such a symbol as part of the
peaceful and orderly discussion of ideas.4" Four decades later, Harold
Spence was similarly seeking the right "words" in displaying an Ameri-
can flag to which he had affixed a large peace symbol.45 The Supreme
Court found that Spence's purpose was to associate the American flag
with peace rather than with war and violence.' No typeset pamphlet
could make the point as vividly as this display. Again the Court recog-
nized this fact and on first amendment grounds reversed Spence's convic-
tion for improper use of the American flag.
As Stromberg and Spence illustrate, the Courts have had little
trouble upholding protection of "symbolic speech" that is motivated by
the speaker's desire to express an idea effectively when alternative forms
of communication fail to convey the same idea. The Court's major con-
cern in these cases is determining whether the speaker's motivation was
in fact one of finding the right "words." This was an important issue in
Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence.a' Was sleeping in Lafay-
ette Park a communicative re-enactment of the central reality of home-
lessness (as Justice Marshall suggested),48 or was it merely facilitative,
that is, a plan to encourage more people to demonstrate (as Justice White
suggested)?49
When alternative modes of expression are insufficient to "capsule"
the speaker's idea, the courts should subject even content-neutral regula-
tion to the strictest standards of first amendment scrutiny. Appeals to
"time, place, and manner" fail in these situations because alternative
41. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
43. Id. at 361.
44. Id. at 369.
45. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
46. Id. at 408.
47. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
48. Id. at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 296. For further discussion of facilitative speech, see infra pp. 600-01.
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channels of communication cannot adequately convey the speaker's
message. Regulation of symbolic conduct that capsules an idea should be
permitted only if the state meets the heavy burden of the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test applied in the context of content-based regulation.
B. Playing Within the Rules
Many may perceive expressive conduct as particularly disruptive.
Those who engage in symbolic speech---especially those expressing a mi-
nority viewpoint-may be looked upon as nonconformists who refuse to
employ "normal" channels of verbal communication. In fact, quite the
contrary is frequently true.
Dissidents are often not as brave as we might like to envision. The
Supreme Court's historic concern with legislation that "chills" expres-
sion stands witness to this reality. 0 Sometimes dissidents understand,
pragmatically, that their ideas will not prevail if expressed too stri-
dently."' In various contexts, expressive conduct is a more acceptable
and less disruptive method of expressing ideas than is verbal speech. For
example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,2 John Tinker's wearing an armband to class in order to protest the
Vietnam War was certainly less disruptive than a vocal protest in the
middle of his classes would have been. Similarly, picketing to protest a
public speaker is more acceptable than engaging in heckling, even though
heckling could be considered verbal speech. 3 In each of these situations,
symbolic expression is the less disruptive alternative.
Historically, the Supreme Court has concentrated on the speech-
conduct dichotomy in a way that has obscured the reality that symbolic
conduct is often less disruptive than pure speech. In the leading case of
50. See, eg., Lamont v. Postmaster General, which struck down a requirement that ad-
dressees of certain Communist political propaganda could receive it only by affirmatively re-
questing the post office to deliver it. The Court noted that "any addressee is likely to feel some
inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have condemned as 'communist polit-
ical propaganda."' 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). See also Note, The Chilling Effect In Constitu-
tional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
51. See, eg., Taylor, Civil Disobedienc" Observations on the Strategies of Protest," re-
printed in H. BOSMAGIAN, DISSENT-SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 86
(1972).
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. See In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970). In Kay, the
California Supreme Court interpreted a statute that prohibited the disturbance of a lawful
meeting. In light of first amendment considerations the California court found the statute
applied only to situations in which hecklers intentionally violated explicit rules or implicit
customs and usages pertaining to the meeting, rules or customs the hecklers knew or should
have known, and then only when the heckling substantially impaired the conduct of the
meeting.
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Cox v. Louisiana,54 the Court focused on types of conduct that are more
disruptive than oral or written speech:
One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red light be-
cause this was thought to be a means of social protest. Nor could
one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in
the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom
of speech or assembly. . . We. emphatically reject the notion
urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments af-
ford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate
ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on
streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who
communicate ideas by pure speech. 5
Acceptance of the Cox paradigm paves the way for diminished pro-
tection of symbolic conduct. When expressive conduct is the least so-
cially disruptive mode of communication, however, application of a
lower level of protection makes no sense. To protect greater disruption
and encourage more significant departures from the norms of civilized
debate in the name of a meaningless speech-conduct distinction is to lose
sight of the government's valid regulatory goals, such as the maintenance
of order in public places.
The Supreme Court took note of this anomaly in Grayned v. City of
Rockford. 6 In assessing the constitutionality of an ordinance that pro-
hibited noise or other diversions that might disturb classes in nearby
schools, Justice Marshall wrote:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dic-
tate[s] the kinds of regulations of time place and manner that are
reasonable." Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with
a public library,... making a speech in the reading room almost
certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly appropriate
in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expres-
sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particu-
lar place at a particular time.57
The speaker who has engaged in symbolic conduct because it is less dis-
ruptive than verbal speech has discovered the norms that Robert Kalven
has called "Robert's Rules of Order" for the public forum. Such a
speaker ought not to be at a disadvantage over his counterpart who is
more disruptive. The nondisruptive speech should enjoy greater protec-
54. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
55. Id. at 554-55.
56. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
57. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
58. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 1,
tion than disruptive speech, regardless of the form of expression the
speaker has chosen.
C. Gaining Media Coverage
One touchstone of a speech's effectiveness is the speaker's ability to
disseminate his ideas to a wide audience. Certainly no vehicle more ef-
fectively reaches the public than the mass media.5 9 The law has, how-
ever, created little in the way of affirmative rights to media access.'
Individuals must often resort to self-help by choosing a mode of commu-
nication that will attract the media. This is precisely what David Paul
O'Brien, a young anti-war protester, did when he burned his draft card
on the steps of the South Boston courthouse in 1966.61
Participation in a "media event" affords a speaker cheap and effec-
tive access to large audiences. As early as the mid-1960s, commentators
observed:
Civil rights demonstrations on public streets and highways are not
directed to reshaping any immediate local attitudes. Instead, they
are aimed at the metropolitan, national, and international opinion
markets, largely controlled by the mass media of TV, radio, news-
papers and national magazines. Sit-downs in Times Square... or
the picketing of the private residences of mayors ... must be ap-
praised, not as appeals to immediate spectators and listeners, but as
gambits to secure space in newspapers, coverage on radio and on
television.62
This observation remains at least as true in the 1980s as it was when it
was written.
The media do not like "talking heads." In order to maintain the
interest of their viewers they prefer "scenes of action so as to heighten the
59. In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court stated, "The electorate's increasing depen-
dence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information have made these
expensive modes of communication indispensible instruments of effective political speech."
424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
60. See Barron, Access To The Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967). The rights provided by the FCC's now repealed "fairness doctrine" were of lim-
ited use to a speaker, since the broadcaster retained broad discretion in selecting the sibject
matter that would be presented over the airwaves. Indeed, the FCC concluded that its fairness
requirements in fact discouraged broadcasters from airing more than the minimally required
amount of programming on controversial issues. FCC, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations
of Broadcast Licensees, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1986). The fairness doctrine was repealed in
August, 1987. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Red 5043
(1987). See also Report on Fairness Doctrine Alternatives, 2 F.C.C. Red 5272 (1987).
61. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the
Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1968).
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visual effect."' 63 Similarly, even reporters of print media are more at-
tracted to dramatic media events. The following excerpt from a newspa-
per story aptly illustrates this phenomenon:
"Hot Sex in Bangkok" has never been hotter than it was yes-
terday when Ron Anderson burned it along with 50 other X-rated
movies from his video store.... For Mr. Anderson, the statement
is simple enough: pornography is bad, and he doesn't want to
make money from it.... Mr. Anderson made no secret of the
reason he decided to burn the movies. "If I didn't destroy some-
thing of value, the news media wouldn't have come," he said. "I
wanted people to know what I was doing." 64
The media event is the modem analogue to the sound truck65 or
door-to-door leaflet distribution;6 6 it provides the poor man with access
to his audience.67 As Justice Black has succinctly observed:
There are many people who have ideas that they wish to dissemi-
nate who do not have enough money to own or control publishing
plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of
show places. Yet everybody knows the vast reaches of these pow-
erful channels of communication which from the very nature of
our economic system must be under the control and guidance of
comparatively few people.68
Government regulation of conduct designed to attract media cover-
age should meet at least as heavy a burden of justification as does govern-
ment regulation of direct spending to gain access to the media. Just as
Buckley v. Valeo69 required a compelling interest in order to restrict di-
rect political expenditures, so too the courts should require a compelling
interest in order to restrain a speaker's use of a "media event" to gain
access to an audience. In Buckley, the Court attempted to distinguish
O'Brien's burning of his draft card from the expenditure of money, hold-
ing that the latter constituted speech.7' However, the Court failed to
examine the motive behind O'Brien's choice of symbolic expression.
When one recognizes the draft card burning as a media event, the anal-
ogy between burning a draft card and spending money is persuasive.
63. E.J. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE-TELEVISION AND THE NEWS 176 (1973).
64. Toledo Blade, Nov. 1, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
65. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saa v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
66. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.").
67. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77, 100 (Black, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 102.
69. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).




In Street v. New York 71 a man reacted angrily to a radio report of
the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith. Bringing his Ameri-
can flag to a nearby intersection, he burned it, saying, "[W]e don't need
no damn flag."72 The Supreme Court's opinion does not relate every-
thing Street said, but one can guess, indeed can almost hear, another
sentence crying out: "I feel better now that I did that!" Professor Emer-
son has identified Street's probable feeling as one of "self-fulfillment." 73
The protection of self-fulfillment is one of the purposes underlying the
First Amendment.74 In many symbolic speech cases, the individual's ex-
pressive conduct similarly is more cathartic than communicative. 7
These cases pose some of the most analytically difficult problems in the
law governing symbolic expression.
For Professor Emerson, determining the role of self-fulfillment in
symbolic expression law is comparatively simple. His self-fulfillment the-
ory draws a sharp line between speech and conduct, protecting seif-fulifi-
ling speech but not conduct.76 The theory would protect the primal
scream, but would protect little that goes beyond the vocal cords and
printing press. As support for the speech-conduct distinction wanes,77
however, the self-fulfillment theory poses a difficult dilemma. In the
words of Professor Gunther, a first amendment claim based on self-fulfil-
ling conduct is virtually "indistinguishable from the autonomy aspects of
substantive due process," that is, from the claim that "'liberty' is broad
enough to protect all individual behavior that does not harm others."'78
This insight is at the core of Professor Schauer's definition of free-
dom of speech as freedom to communicate.7 9 It suggests that the Court
should permit greater governmental control of symbolic expression when
it is not communicative, when it is motivated primarily by a desire to
achieve self-satisfaction rather than to communicate to others." Other-
wise we must resort to drawing an artificial line between speech and con-
71. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
72. Id. at 578-79.
73. T. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 6. See also M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1.03.
74. Self fulfillment also has other aspects. Emerson refers to it as "the realization of
[man's] character and potentialities as a human being." T. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 6.
75. Id. § 1.03. See also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978).
76. T. EMERSON, supra note 24, at 8-9.
77. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
78. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrITIONAL LAw 979, 1089 n. 12 (11th ed. 1985). See also F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 50-59 (1982).
79. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 78, at 53.
80. Id. at 92-106.
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duct to prevent the First Amendment from undermining the legitimate
exercise of governmental police powers. Some case law supports this
analysis. For example, in Kelley v. Johnson,"1 the Supreme Court rejected
a policeman's due process attack on hair grooming regulations imposed
by the county police commissioner. The Court indicated that it would
strike down the regulations only if the plaintiff demonstrated that "there
is no rational connection between the regulation... and the promotion
of the safety of persons and property." 2 The Court did not treat the case
as one involving hair length as protected expression of the policeman's
personality which could be censored only under the traditional first
amendment criteria.1
3
In most symbolic expression cases the courts have not inquired
whether communication or self-fulfillment was the actor's primary moti-
vation. Making such an inquiry would substantially further the develop-
ment of an appropriate symbolic expression doctrine.
E. Facilitative Conduct
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,84 the majority
drew a sharp distinction between expressive conduct and conduct that
merely facilitates effective speech. The Court stated:
[A]lthough we have assumed for present purposes that the sleeping
banned in this case would have an expressive element, it is evident
that its major value to this demonstration would be facilitative.
Without a permit to sleep, it would be difficult to get the poor and
homeless to participate or to be present at all.8 5
In other areas, however, the Court has fully protected facilitative
speech. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo,8 6 the Court specifically refused
to treat the expenditure of money to produce speech as expressive con-
duct. It held instead that the fact that an individual's communication
depended on the expenditure of money did not introduce a non-speech
element.8 7 More recently, in Meyer v. Grant 8 8 the Court struck down a
Colorado statute prohibiting payment to persons employed to circulate
81. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
82. Id. at 247.
83. See Breen v. Kal, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970)
(right to wear one's hair at any length may be a right protected within the penumbras of first
amendment freedom of speech).
84. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
85. Id. at 296.
86. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
87. Id. at 16-17.
88. 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
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initiative petitions for voter signatures, finding that the restriction upon
such payment unconstitutionally restricts political expression.
The standard of protection for activities that facilitate expression is
far from clear.8 9 This issue deserves closer examination than the Court's
perfunctory analysis in Clark. Courts should examine the extent to
which speech truly would be deterred if related facilitative conduct were
not protected. As the facilitative conduct becomes more essential to the
production of speech, they should require a more compelling governmen-
tal interest.90
Conclusion
Current law governing symbolic expression asks the wrong ques-
tions. Courts have focused solely on governmental motivation, rather
than considering the speaker's purpose as well. Determining why the
speaker has chosen a particular mode of expression would more effec-
tively protect the goals underlying the First Amendment.
Courts and commentators often rely on the speech-conduct dichot-
omy to determine the boundary between free expression and more gen-
eral due process claims.91 The general inadequacies of this approach
92
suggest that a different line needs to be drawn. The use of speaker moti-
vation to establish a judicial balance of first amendment interests is a
solution more in tune with our traditions of protecting "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open" debate. 93
89. Cf Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (newsmen have no constitutional right of
access to prisons beyond that afforded to the general public).
90. But compare the standard used in Clark with that in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 (striking
down restrictions on direct spending "because virtually every means of communicating ideas
in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money").
91. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
93. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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